Mental states & Mental Content
Mental states are exactly what they sound like. Anything arising in the mind, or from the mind, is a mental state. These states, these brain processes, can have phenomenal character or intentionality. In other words, they can be a first person experience or be about other concepts/things.
Mental content refers to the content, or meaning, held in states like belief, desire, wish, thought, fear, or intention. Philosophers debate over where that content can be found. Does the meaning of our mental states lie in relationships to external factors or simply on the factors of our individual perceptions? Those that believe our attitudes have meaning only because they refer to the external world, and are determined outside of an individual, hold with a wide content view. Anyone believing, as Terence Horgan and John Tienson do, that meaning is in the head, and dependent on an individual's experience of the world, entertains a narrow content view.
Wide content Belief
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Narrow Content Belief
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In simple terms, which philosophers don't traditionally use, a wide content viewpoint, or content externalism, holds that meaning is determined externally. Much like social construction theory in the study of language and epistemology, some philosophers of mind believe that the meaning of our thoughts is negotiated between individuals. I can believe whatever I like, but the truth or falsity of my beliefs is constituted by whether or not the community I'm in holds that belief as well. We construct our thoughts and beliefs in such a way that we can communicate and work with other people, and so it must have meaning for other people as well as for my own self. This philosophical perspective grew from the need to ground mental activity in natural sciences, in a functional or material way so the hard problem of consciousness (how and why we have first personal experiences) could be circumvented.
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Narrow content views, like phenomenal intentionality, emphasize truth in the head, individually. A person holds beliefs, desires, thoughts, and wishes fundamentally because they have direct experiences of their environment. To Horgan and Tienson, however, this personal experience necessarily has an intentional aspect and vice versa. We can't have sensory experiences without having a concept of the environment or object that presents those experiences to our nervous system. Conversely, we can't have ideas about external occurrences without knowing what it's like to experience them. Narrow content beliefs revive the significance of first personal experience, but fail to show how individuals can agree upon truths. If the truth or falsity of our beliefs can't be proven through objective, external means, then it seems as if there could never be proof of unity of thought over a group of individuals.
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Why does this matter? Here's a real life example to put this in perspective:
In an argument about marriage rights, Josh says he thinks the term and privileges should be granted only to heterosexual couples. Through personal experiences he feels that allowing gay couples to marry would detract from the significance of his own relationship. Those in his community agree on the belief that marriage should be a human right, not a heterosexual right, and have done research on the success of marriage and parenthood across all sexual orientations and gender identifications and can give strong scientific evidence against Josh's belief.
This very debate has probably featured somewhere during your social media journey and you no doubt have seen responses ranging from, "How could you possibly believe that, Josh, you're so behind the times and here are all the reasons why you're wrong!" to "Well, everyone's entitled to their own beliefs." These responses, in turn, reflect the wide and narrow content beliefs held by others.
In an argument about marriage rights, Josh says he thinks the term and privileges should be granted only to heterosexual couples. Through personal experiences he feels that allowing gay couples to marry would detract from the significance of his own relationship. Those in his community agree on the belief that marriage should be a human right, not a heterosexual right, and have done research on the success of marriage and parenthood across all sexual orientations and gender identifications and can give strong scientific evidence against Josh's belief.
- Wide Content View: According to the truth of his environment, Josh is wrong. Regardless of how he feels and how his life experiences have shaped or influenced that belief.
- Narrow Content View: Josh is right, regardless of any external conditions.
This very debate has probably featured somewhere during your social media journey and you no doubt have seen responses ranging from, "How could you possibly believe that, Josh, you're so behind the times and here are all the reasons why you're wrong!" to "Well, everyone's entitled to their own beliefs." These responses, in turn, reflect the wide and narrow content beliefs held by others.